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Abstract
Despite the lack of convincing evidence that active investment fund
managers add value, the number of actively-managed US mutual funds
has increased substantially over the last 25 years. While non-sector
diversified mutual funds have received much attention, sector funds,
except real estate mutual funds (REMFs), have not. In this paper, we
provide new and more robust evidence on the performance of active
REMFs compared to all actively managed mutual funds. We use the
Carhart four-factor model with an additional liquidity factor as a risk-
adjusted benchmark. We use wild bootstrap methods to deal with
small samples, non-normality and heteroscedasticity, and we control
for the false discovery of significant results.
For portfolios of fund types, we find evidence of both significant
outperformance and underperformance, net of fees, during 1992-2016.
We consider non-overlapping five-year and three-year periods and find
very limited evidence of persistent outperformance. For individual
funds, we find that, for both sector and diversified funds, net of fees,
only 0.79% are skilled. We find persistence in skills for only two indi-
vidual fund managers of diversified funds.
We investigate the effects of the outsourcing of management and
of team versus individual management. Outsourcing has no effect
on performance of non-RE sector funds but, for cap-based funds and
style-based funds, it has a negative effect. There is some evidence that
this may also be true for REMFs. Team management has no effect
for any types of funds.
Overall, we conclude that REMFs are generally no different from
other sector funds.
Keywords: mutual fund performance evaluation; false discovery rate;
risk-factor model; real estate
JEL Classification: R31, C14
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1 Introduction
The ability of active investment fund managers to add value has long been
the subject of academic research. Although this research produces limited
evidence of superior risk-adjusted performance from active management, the
number of actively-managed US mutual funds has increased substantially.
Between 1992 and 2016, the number of active non-sector diversified mutual
funds grew from 1330 to 4179, while mutual funds specialising in a particular
industrial sector grew at the same rate, from 169 to 540, but represented only
11 percent of mutual funds.1 The argument for these actively-managed funds
remains that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) that active managers are able
to develop superior skills in stock selection and the timing of purchases and
sales.
Despite the growth of actively-managed sector mutual funds, there are
no significant studies of such funds, with the exception of real estate mutual
funds (REMFs). This paper fills the gap. The previous focus could be jus-
tified, in part, by the long history and the relatively large number (173) of
real estate funds, and by claimed information inefficiencies in the underlying
real estate investment market. Such studies compare fund performance to
that of a risk-adjusted benchmark and examine the regression constant, al-
pha, as the measure of differential performance. However, overall, these real
estate studies provide limited evidence of added value. Although a couple
of studies (Gallo et al. 2000, Kallberg et al. 2000) identify some superior
outperformance for REMFs, other studies do not (O’Neal and Page 2000,
Lin and Yung 2004, Rodriguez 2007, Chiang et al. 2008, Hartzell et al. 2010,
Chou and Hardin 2014). However, no study compares REMFs with other
sector funds nor with the much larger number of non-sector diversified mu-
tual funds. Nor does any consider the effects of outsourcing or of team versus
individual management.
It might be argued that, as they invest predominantly in REITs, the
mutual fund managers are dealing with securitized investments so there is no
fundamental difference from any other sector and no reason to expect added
value in this sector. A more general argument is that of market maturity,
whereby a new or rapidly growing mutual fund sector may generate initial
superior performance but that this is soon lost as the market matures and
becomes more informed and competitive.
In this paper, we provide new and robust evidence on the performance
of actively-managed REMFs. We place this performance in the context of
1During the same period, passive funds grew more quickly, from 13 to 439 for sector
funds and from 54 to 1145 for non-sector diversified funds.
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all types of U.S. domestic mutual funds that actively manage their portfolio
holdings. We are interested both in groups of funds of the same type and
in individual funds. We also consider the persistence of performance for
the fund types and for individual funds. Finally, we consider the effects on
performance of outsourcing of fund management, and of whether funds are
team- or individually-managed.
For our analysis, we use the CRSP Mutual Fund database, which is free of
survivor and incubation biases, and we test a variety of benchmarks. In order
to deal with manager skills, as opposed to luck, we use the wild bootstrap
method, which deals with heteroscedasticity and the small sample sizes used
to estimate the performance statistics. And, as we have multiple tests in
our analysis of the performance of thousands of funds, we control for false
discovery.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a litera-
ture review, section 3 sets out the methodology and section 4 discusses the
data. Then, section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 provides a
conclusion.
2 Literature Review
Although there has been extensive research on actively-managed, diversified,
equity mutual funds, there has been no general consideration of specialised
sector funds, which are typically excluded from analyses of mutual funds
because of their distinctively different investment strategies. The exception
is REMFs, which have received some attention but there is no research to
suggest whether REMFs are similar to, or different from, other sector funds
or, indeed, non-sector diversified funds.
The literature on diversified funds provides ‘little convincing evidence’ of
mutual fund outperformance (Kallberg et al. 2000, 387). We do not review
this literature here2 but two papers are of relevance to the consideration of
sector funds. The first is by Chen et al. (2004) who find that small mutual
funds, on average, outperform large mutual funds. They attribute this to the
interaction of liquidity and organisational diseconomies. In a small organisa-
tion, it is easier to convince decision-makers of the value of soft information,
that is, information that can be directly verified only by the person who
produces it. In the context of mutual funds, such information is most likely
to be research or investment ideas related to companies located near a fund
headquarters. It is also possible that, while a small fund can invest in the
best opportunities, a large fund may be forced into some poorer investments
2See Cremers et al. (2019) for a comprehensive review that covers this literature.
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that erode overall performance. This might suggest the possibility of superior
performance in general for sector funds, which are, on average, smaller than
diversified funds, and in particular for the real estate sector, where softer
and more local knowledge is likely to be important. The second paper is
by Kacperczyk et al. (2005) who find that industrial concentration, on aver-
age, improves mutual fund performance. They argue that the reason may be
that managers believe some industries will outperform or that they possess
superior information to enable them to select under-priced stocks in specific
industries. Sector funds are unable to move from a concentration in several
industries to a concentration in others, which might affect their performance.
Thus, actively-managed REMFs merit consideration and comparison to other
actively-managed sector funds and to other types of actively-managed funds.
Despite the potential importance of sector funds, only real estate has
received any significant attention, so there has been no direct comparison of
REMFs with other sector mutual funds nor with the large diversified mutual
fund market. REMFs emerged in the late 1980s and became the largest
of the mutual fund sectors by the end of 2016. Most studies of REMFs,
in line with the literature for diversified mutual funds, find no evidence of
outperformance, a finding which is robust to different methods. While a
couple of studies (Gallo et al. 2000, Kallberg et al. 2000) do identify superior
outperformance for REMFs, other studies (O’Neal and Page 2000, Lin and
Yung 2004, Rodriguez 2007, Chiang et al. 2008, Hartzell et al. 2010, Chou
and Hardin 2014), using different time periods and benchmarks, find little or
no evidence of superior performance among REMFs.
Gallo et al. (2000) find that 24 REMFs during 1991-7, on average, out-
performed both the Wilshire RES index (REITs) and a three factor model
including the Wilshire and performance relative to a stock and to a bond
index. However, they attribute this outperformance not to stock selection
but to fund manager decisions to overweight outperforming real estate types.
Kallberg et al. (2000, 387) consider 44 REMFs during 1986-98 and claim that
‘the average and median alphas (net of expenses) are positive’. However, the
result is sensitive to the choice of benchmark. For single factor models, the
result is significant for the S&P 500 and two of the four RE benchmarks; for
multi-factor models, it is significant for a four-factor model (the Fama-French
three-factor model plus excess returns against a bond index) but, when an
RE index is added, alpha is significant only when the RE index includes RE
Operating Companies (REOCs) as well as REITs. They attribute the result
to superior information among RE fund managers because of the costs of
acquisition in the RE market.
In contrast, O’Neal and Page (2000), in a study of 50 funds during 1996-
8, find no evidence of superior REMF performance against a benchmark
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comprising indices of REITs, a small stock index, a general stock index
and a global stock index. Similarly, Lin and Yung (2004) find that 83
REMFs during 1993-2001 did not outperform the market, on average and
net of fees, regardless of the benchmark used - they tried a simple CAPM
model, the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French 1993) and the
Carhart four-factor model (Carhart 1997), all with either a stock index or
the NAREIT index. Nor does Rodriguez (2007) find any evidence of outper-
formance in a study of 35 REMFs during 1999-2004, although his benchmark
is a series of RE sub-indices.
Chiang et al. (2008), for a study of 55 REMFs during 1982-2003, con-
clude that, on average, REMFs are not capable of outperformance. Their
initial results, using the CAPM and a Fama-French three-factor benchmark,
indicate superior performance, but they argue that only outperformance rel-
ative to the NAREIT benchmark should be considered and that produces a
result of no superior performance. They conclude (Chiang et al. 2008, 60)
that the result is ‘consistent with an equilibrium in which competition drives
away abnormal returns’. This is an argument to which we will return in our
empirical results.
Hartzell et al. (2010) examine 132 funds’ returns, before and net of ex-
penses, during 1994-2005, using various benchmarks and only find evidence
of outperformance with respect to real estate index benchmarks. They use
three benchmarks derived from portfolios of REITs. The first benchmark
uses the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors, but with the
factor returns constructed from REITs rather than common stocks; the sec-
ond consists of the returns of portfolios sorted by property type; and the third
combines the first two. Finally, as REMFs sometimes invest in non-REIT
real estate companies, an index of homebuilders’ stock returns and two dif-
ferent REOC indices are included. The analyses show that a value-weighted
portfolio of REMFs fails to outperform any of these benchmarks net of fees.
And, although benchmark choice has little effect on the aggregate portfolio,
‘the performance of individual mutual funds can be much more sensitive to
the benchmark choice’ (Hartzell et al. 2010, 124). Finally, Chou and Hardin
(2014) use a sample of 160 funds during 1994-2006 and against benchmarks
of CAPM, Carhart (1997) and Carhart with four real estate industry indices,
and find that REMFs do not outperform.
In contrast to the attention given to the REMFs, there has been very lim-
ited research on other sectors, which we redress. Khorana and Nelling (1997)
consider 147 funds in seven sectors, but excluding real estate, during 1976-92.
Against the S&P500, there was no outperformance but, when sector specific
benchmarks were used, there was. The only other work of significance that
we can find on sector funds is two working papers (Tiwari and Vijh 2001,
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2004). The first of these considers persistence in performance among 607 ac-
tively managed mutual funds in six sectors during 1990-2000. They suggest
that the arguments in favour of sector funds are framed in terms of some
sectors being ‘characterized by a greater degree of information asymmetry
between insiders and outsiders’ and point specifically to the real estate and
technology sectors (Tiwari and Vijh 2001, 3). They find no persistence in
performance. In the second paper, they use the Carhart model plus a sector
index as the benchmark and find that sector funds neither out- nor under-
perform but that diversified funds underperform, although the difference is
not economically significant.
From the above review, it is clear that choice of benchmark is an im-
portant aspect of the modelling of performance. While earlier studies used
stock, bond and real estate indices, there seems to have emerged a broad
consensus on the use of factors models, such as the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (which is the Fama-
French three-factor model plus a momentum factor) and, more recently, on
the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model.3 In the first two cases, these
have been used with sector indices and also with factors constructed from
real estate data rather than common stock data. Most studies test a variety
of benchmarks, but there is no universal answer to the optimal benchmark
specification.
The importance of liquidity risk in the pricing of real estate securities has
been addressed by Soyeh and Wiley (2019) and Hoesli et al. (2017). None of
the above benchmarks explicitly considers liquidity. However, DiBartolomeo
et al. (2020), in their analysis of the liquidity risk of REITs, use a liquid-
ity measure proposed by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). This risk factor
captures liquidity related to temporary price fluctuations induced by order
flow, and represents the market-wide systematic measure for liquidity fluc-
tuations. Dong et al. (2019) also follow this approach and find that this
liquidity factor plays an important pricing role in the cross-section of mutual
3The three original factors in Fama and French (1993) are: the excess return rate of
the value-weighted aggregate market portfolio of stocks traded at the NYSE, Amex, and
NASDAQ (MKT ); the size risk factor (SMB); and the value growth risk factor (HML).
The Fama and French (2015) five-factor model is constructed by adding two additional
factors to their three-factor model, motivated by the dividend discount valuation model
and anomalies unexplained by the three-factor model. Their fourth factor measures op-
erating profitability risk and is the difference between the return rates of diversified stock
portfolios of companies with robust profitability to those with weak profitability (RMW ).
Their fifth factor is the difference between returns on diversified portfolios of stocks of
conservative (low) and aggressive (high) investment firms (CMA). The Carhart (1997)
momentum factor is the difference between the average return rates of diversified stock
portfolios of companies sorted by the previous 12-month return rates.
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funds. Accordingly, we include this factor.
We are interested not only in the existence of out- (and under-) perfor-
mance but also in its persistence. This has been examined using several
methods. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) compare two five year periods by re-
gressing fund alphas in one period on those for the other. They test the slope
coefficient and fail to reject the hypothesis of positive persistence. Gruber
(1996) constructs decile portfolios based on one and three-year performance,
calculates the rank correlation coefficients of prior and subsequent perfor-
mance, and finds significant results. In contrast, Carhart (1997) constructs
decile portfolios of equity mutual funds and concludes that persistence in
performance is found mostly among poorly performing funds; and Kallberg
et al. (2000), using the same approach, with quintile portfolios, find little
evidence of persistence in returns in REMFs over six-month or 12-month
periods.4 Nor do Tiwari and Vijh (2001), also using quintile portfolios, find
any persistence. Finally, for real estate, Lin and Yung (2004) estimate an
autocorrelation model for the residuals from benchmark models of individual
fund performance and find persistence in the short term (up to eight months)
for both over- and underperforming funds. We consider persistence and are
specifically interested in whether the results are consistent with a hypothesis
of market maturity and the competing away of superior performance.
None of the studies considered above addresses the need to distinguish
between skills and luck. It is possible that fund managers with significantly
positive risk-adjusted returns may not be genuinely skilled and may only
achieve outperformance through luck. Most studies rely on a t-test of the
null hypothesis that the outperformance, as measured by the constant, alpha,
in the regression models outlined above, is zero. This is subject to a Type
I error, termed false discovery or family-wise error, which is problematic
when multiple hypotheses are tested simultaneously for all fund managers.
Further, the test used typically assumes a normal distribution for a fund’s
return history, which is a poor approximation in practice.
While none of the real estate studies has considered false discovery, recent
work by Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French (2010), and Barras et al.
(2010) has addressed the issue. We explain the technical aspects in the
next section and here address only the results. Both Kosowski et al. (2006)
and Fama and French (2010) find that few active growth fund managers
possess genuine skills to produce outperformance when expenses are taken
4They examine a number of benchmarks and conclude (p400) that ’If an investor con-
fines his investment entirely to REITs, then the highest return funds provide a persistent
abnormal return. However, for investors who consider portfolios of REITs and other
common stocks, the multi-factor benchmarks are more appropriate and there is little per-
sistence in lagged returns.’
8
into account, but neither considers sector funds. Barras et al. (2010) find
a downward trend in the proportion of skilled funds and an upward trend
in the proportion of unskilled funds, with a significant proportion of skilled
managers before 1996 but almost none after 1996. They suggest that the
decreasing average alpha may be the result of increased competition but also
that the flow of funds to successful managers may compete away any surplus
alpha. Overall, these results for outperformance suggest merit in applying a
variant of these approaches to sector funds, specifically to REMFs.
Two other issues in the literature merit attention: the impact of out-
sourcing of fund management, and whether the funds are individually- or
team-managed. Outsourcing is a common practice: according to Chen et al.
(2013, 530), roughly 41% of fund families at least partially delegate the man-
agement process to an unaffiliated adviser and, in terms of total net assets,
outsourced funds represent 26% of funds in a typical fund family. This may
be because of cost efficiencies and capacity constraints. The mutual fund
company, that is the fund family of an outsourced fund, monitors invest-
ment performance in terms of return and risk-taking behaviour. Chen et al.
(2013, 532) note that the ’outsourced funds tend to be younger (8.0 years
to 11.4 years)’ and suggest that fund families are more likely to close out-
sourced funds because of poor performance or excessive risk-taking behaviour
(p.545). They conclude that, while outsourcing produces roughly the same
market beta, it leads to underperformance of at least 50 bps a year. They
explain this as an agency problem. Chuprinin et al. (2015) consider subcon-
tracting among international mutual funds and find that in-house managed
funds outperformed outsourced funds by 85 basis points per year. They
attribute this (p.2275) to ‘preferential treatment of in-house funds via the
preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross trades’.
Bliss et al. (2008) point to a growth in team management of equity mutual
funds, from 30% in 1993 to 56% in 2003. They suggest (p110) that this could
be to ’avoid falling victim to ”stars” that leave’ or because ’groups make bet-
ter decisions in the areas of selecting and managing a stock portfolio’. How-
ever, using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method and the Carhart model,
they find ’no statistically or economically significant differences between in-
dividually managed and team-managed mutual funds’ (p.115). Massa et al.
(2010) focus on named versus anonymous fund managers but also consider
individual versus team management. They find no significant difference in
either case, using the CAPM and Carhart benchmarks.5 Finally, Patel and
Sarkissian (2017), who argue that their data on managers is more reliable,
5They do not use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method, although they note that it
produces the same results.
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use the Carhart model, both without and with the Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003) liquidity factor, and conclude that team-managed funds have higher
risk-adjusted annual returns by 30-40 bps. They also find a non-linear rela-
tionship between team size and fund performance with three-member teams
being best. However, none of these papers on outsourcing or the size of the
management team considers sector funds.
In this study, we improve on previous REMF analyses in seven main ways.
First, we compare REMFs to the universe of actively-managed equity mu-
tual funds, comprising funds in 11 sectors and seven diversified fund types.
Second, we use bootstrap approaches to deal with non-normality and het-
eroscedasticity. Third, unlike all previous real estate and sector studies, we
address the issue of false discovery to distinguish between skilled and lucky
managers. Fourth, after testing a range of factor models for mutual funds, we
chose a model with an additional liquidity factor. Fifth, unlike some previous
studies6, we use the CRSP Mutual Fund database, which is free of survivor
bias. We also control for incubation bias (Evans 2010), which may also lead
to errors in assessment of performance and was not considered by existing
sector fund and REMF studies. Sixth, we consider persistence in a number of
ways, both at fund type and individual fund levels. Finally, we examine the
effect of outsourcing and of individual versus team management on mutual
fund performance for both diversified funds and sector funds, using a more
disaggregated approach than other studies.
The next section details technical issues of the methods.
3 Methodology
3.1 Introduction
A skilled fund manager is able to generate return rates that at least compen-
sate investors for the risk taken. An unskilled manager might generate such
return rates too, but only occasionally as the result of luck. This brings two
complications for the assessment of fund managers. First, return rates must
be measured against what the market sees as fair compensation. Second, the
usually short history of fund data and the time-varying volatility of return
rates requires careful statistical analysis.
Our empirical examination of the performance of fund managers builds
6The data sources for REMFs, such as Morningstar (O’Neal and Page 2000, Rodriguez
2007, Chiang et al. 2008) and Yahoo Finance (Lin and Yung 2004), are subject to survivor
bias, which may cause overestimation of performance.
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on the regression
(1) ri,t = αi + xtβi + εi,t
The return rate ri,t in month t is in excess of the risk-free rate. The index
i relates either to an individual fund or a portfolio of funds with a weighted
return rate. The fair compensation xtβi is based on a linear asset pricing
model with K risk factors, all traded, collated in the row vector xt. The
factor loadings are collated in the column vector βi. The innovations εi,t can
by heteroscedastic, might follow a non-symmetric distribution, and are likely
to be correlated contemporaneously. We write Eq. 1 compactly as
(2)
ri = αiιi + Xiβi + εi
= Ziθi + εi
The column vector ri stacks the Ti return rates, ιi a column vector of ones,
and Xi stacks the factor vectors xt that correspond to i’s return rates. We





is the average of the return rate in excess of the estimated fair compensation,
see Appendix A.1. We expect αi = 0 if i is managed passively and αi > 0 if
managed actively by managers with skill.
3.2 Tests of asset pricing models
It is essential that we use the correct asset pricing model to estimate the
fair compensation. As passive funds do not try to beat the market, the
correct model—represented by the traded risk factors included in xt —will
lead to alphas that are zero. Individual passive funds can close and merge
and we construct portfolios of funds for the tests. This ensures that each
portfolio has T monthly return rate observations. The monthly return rate
of a portfolio is computed as value-weighted average return rate of the funds
included.
We then estimate θi separately for each portfolio and test whether the
alphas for all portfolios are jointly zero.7 We use the robust covariance esti-
mator of Kiefer and Vogelsang (2002) in the joint test statistic for αi = 0, all
i, to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation as it improves infer-
ence in finite samples. For comparison, we conduct the same test separately
7Stacking the portfolio regressions leads to identical estimators as separate regressions,
see Appendix A.1.
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also for portfolios of active funds. This provides results for 18 portfolios
over the full sample period. In addition, we also estimate Eq. 2 over rolling
windows of five years to examine the behaviour of the alpha estimates over
time.
3.3 Tests of fund performance
We estimate Eq. 2 separately for each fund i to assess average performance.
As Ti 6 T , it is no longer possible to estimate a covariance matrix and to
conduct a joint test on alphas. Instead, we will test whether alphas are
zero for funds individually, but we will take account of conducting the tests
simultaneously.
As the fund returns rate series do not always overlap and because stock
return rates show heavy tails and can be heteroscedastic, we rely on the
bootstrap to improve the finite sample inference. In particular, we use the
fixed-design wild bootstrap to estimate the distribution of the individual
test statistics under the null. There is evidence that the wild bootstrap
performs well if the data are generated by a dynamic process characterized
by heteroscedasticity of unknown form (Gonçalves and Kilian 2004).
First, we use the actual data (ri,Xi) and estimate Eq. 2 under the re-
striction of a zero constant (αi = 0) for each of the I funds.
8 We keep the
estimated vector of factor loadings β̃i and the vector of re-centered residuals
ε̃i. We generate bootstrap notional return rate replications (b = 1, . . . , B)
(4) rbi = Xiβ̃i + Υ
b
i ε̃i
which impose that the manager of fund i has no skill. The bootstrap variation
comes from the diagonal of the (Ti × Ti) matrix Υbi , which consists of draws
from the Rademacher distribution.9 New realizations from this distribution
are drawn for each b > 1. We conduct B bootstrap replications, which leads
to the set Bi = {(rbi ,Xi)}Bb=1. Second, we fit the regression Eq. 2 for each of

















8For details on the implementation, see Flachaire (2005), Davidson et al. (2007), and
Davidson and Flachaire (2008).
9Possible outcomes of the distribution are υ ∈ {−1, 1} with P (υ = −1) = P (υ = 1) =
0.5.
10The (1× Ti) vector e′i has a one as first element and zeros elsewhere.
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The covariance matrix Ω̂
b








−1Z′i and ε̃i,t is the re-centred residual from the restricted
regression. Finally, we use the estimated distribution of test statistics under
the null and compute
(7)






where t̂i is the test statistic for αi when we fit Eq. 2 to the actual data.
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If we test αi = 0 at significance level γ = 0.05 and the hypothesis is true,
we will make a false discovery with a probability of 5%. If we test the same
(true) hypotheses for two funds each with individual tests at γ = 0.05, the
probability for at least one false discovery will be larger than 5%. Control of
the family-wise error rate is one approach to deal with this problem. However,
as investors want to learn about funds that are worth further investigation,
this strict approach will not be attractive - see Appendix A.2. We rely
instead on the false discovery rate to account for the simultaneous testing
of the performance of thousands of funds. According to Storey (2002), the




π0 is the proportion of funds in the data that have managers with no skill,
γ is the significance level used in the individual tests of manager skill, and
P (γ) is the probability of rejections. Therefore, Eq. 8 relates the expected
proportion π0γ of false discoveries to the expected proportion of all discov-
eries. Appendix A.3 motivates and provides details on the estimation of π0.
We estimate the denominator of Eq. 8 with






11The indicator function 1(·) becomes one if the argument is true and zero else. We
estimate the standard error σ̂i for t̂i with Eq. 6, but use ε̂i instead of the re-centred
residuals.
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We use the q-value introduced by Storey (2002, Algorithm 2) to make state-
ments on the skills of individual fund managers while taking into account
that we consider I managers simultaneously. First, we sort the pi-values and




, where p̂(I) is the largest of the I p-values and
pFDR is given in Eq. 8. This gives the minimum pFDR we can archive if we
reject for all p̂i 6 pI . For the next largest p-value, the pFDR is computed as








and so forth. This procedure ensures that the q-values follow the same order
as the p-values. If we find a rate of false discoveries acceptable, for instance
q∗ = 10%, then we will call all those funds discoveries for which qi 6 q∗.
3.4 Performance and fund characteristics
Fund characteristics might have an impact on the returns above the fair
compensation that a fund generates. For instance, it might matter for the
performance whether a fund is the managed by an entity that is affiliated
with the fund management family, the sponsor, or not. Other characteristics
such as age and TNA can also impact on the performance.
We use cross-sectional regressions for this analysis and proceed in three
stages. First, we separate the funds that exist each month into four groups
based on investment focus (cap, style, real estate, other sector). We then
split each of these groups further into funds that are managed by an entity
affiliated with the fund management family and into funds that are managed
externally. For each of these eight groups, we sort the funds into quintiles
based on their TNA and compute equally-weighted return rates. This leads
to 8×5 = 40 return rate series for these portfolios. We also generate a second
grouping, where we split each of the investment focus groups into groups of
funds that are managed by a team and those that are managed by a named
manager.12
We follow the cross-sectional regression approach of Chen et al. (2013),
which is similar, but not identical, to the approach introduced by Fama and
MacBeth (1973). Using five years of returns (60 months), we estimate first
Eq.2 separately for each of the portfolios, where we use the factors xt from the
asset pricing model that passed the test. The resulting factor β̂p are then used
as regressors in a cross-sectional regression for the following month (month
61). In particular, we regress fund return rates for this month, ri,t, on a
constant and the β̂p(i,t) of the group to which fund i belongs. This regression
12Obviously, the latter will also have a team to assist with the management duties.
Naming the team leader may make sense if she or he has a good reputation in the market.
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leads to estimates of the risk premiums (γ̂0,t, γ̂1,t). The same regression is
fitted for the next eleven months. After that, the factor loadings are updated
to provide new estimates of β̂p for the next twelve months.
Given the risk premiums, we compute the fund return rate adjusted for
the fair compensation
(11) rai,t = ri,t − γ̂0 − γ̂1β̂p(i,t)
Stacking all return rates for a given month gives the second cross-sectional
regression model
(12) rat = Ztφt + εt
where the matrix Zt contains the constant term, characteristics of the fund
and control variables. As the number of funds varies over time, the number
of rows in Zt changes accordingly. However, the dimension K of φt stays the
same. Finally, we run the regression
(13) φ̂t = IKδ + ξt
for t ∈ {61, T}. Each element of δ̂ is simply the time-average of the cor-
responding elements in φ̂t. We estimate the standard errors with a robust
covariance estimator to account for heteroscedasticity and correlation.
4 Data
The data for the sector and non-sector funds comes from the survivor-bias-
free U.S. Mutual Fund Database of the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP), covering January 1992 to December 2016. The data provide a com-
prehensive coverage of monthly return rates, total net assets (TNA), operat-
ing expenses and fund management companies.
The CRSP objective code in the data provides a relatively consistent
classification for the U.S. domestic sector and diversified funds. In CRSP,
there are 13 U.S. domestic sectors, including healthcare, consumer goods, con-
sumer services, commodities, financial services, gold, industrial, materials,
real estate, natural resources, technology, telecommunication, and utilities.
We exclude the commodities sector from our analysis owing to missing data
during 1992-1996, and we exclude the gold sector as the CRSP classification
is not consistent during 1992-2016. For REMFs, we use the classification
provided by the CRSP Style Code.13 As for all funds, we do not impose an
13The CRSP mutual funds database includes style and objective codes from three differ-
ent sources over the life of the database. The CRSP Style Code builds continuity within
the database by using Wiesenberger, Strategic Insight Objective, and Lipper Objective
codes as its base and provides consistency with those codes.
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additional filter for fund size but require that a fund has been in existence
for a minimum of five years. The portfolio holdings of REMFs are shown
in Figure 1.14 Approximately 80% is invested in REITs, although this has
ranged from 75-90%, and other RE investment is around 10%, although it
has ranged from 0-20%.
[Figure 1 about here]
For the diversified funds, there are seven types for style and cap-based
funds: growth & income, growth, hedged, income, mid cap, micro cap, and
small cap. We omit large cap as the series starts after 1992. Thus, we
examine funds from the 18 fund segments given in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Mutual funds tend to offer different shareclasses15 to investors, even
though the returns come from the same portfolio. The data report net re-
turn rates for each fund shareclass separately. For each fund and month, we
compute the weighted net fund return rate by averaging over the net return
rates of a fund’s different shareclasses using, as weights, the ratios of share-
class net assets to the fund’s total net assets (TNA). The resulting net return
rate is what the average investor receives when investing in the fund. Share-
class aggregation prevents newly-created shareclasses of a fund from causing
duplication of return data that comes, effectively, from the same portfolio.16
Monthly gross return rates are not reported in the data. To calculate
these, we use the expense ratio, which is the ratio of a fund’s operating
expenses to its TNA. We compute the monthly gross return rates for each
fund by adding one-twelfth of its yearly expenses ratio to its monthly net
return rates. If a fund’s expense ratio is missing in any year, we follow Fama
and French (2010) and fill in the missing values with the average expense
ratios of active funds with similar assets under management (AUM).
As our interest lies in actively managed funds, we need to be able to iden-
tify them. This is no problem from June 2008 onward as they are identified in
the database but, before that date, CRSP does not identify a fund as active
or passive. We follow the procedure suggested by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú
(2009) to identify active and passive funds before June 2008. For details, see
Appendix A.5.
14The data are not available before 2002.
15Shareclasses can differ regarding their front- and back-end loads paid to brokers, and
the contribution to annual operating expenses of portfolio management.
16Shareclasses of the same fund typically have the same return history, as they have
the same investment portfolio. Aggregation of their returns at the fund level prevents
double-counting. The approach of shareclass aggregation is set out in Appendix A.4.
16
Although the CRSP mutual fund database is free from survivor bias, in-
cubation bias is another concern raised in the literature (Evans 2010), which
may cause overestimation of fund performance. Fund management compa-
nies commonly provide seed money to newly-launched funds to develop a
longer return history. Incubation bias occurs when funds open to the pub-
lic, and their pre-release return history is included in the fund database if it
appears to be attractive. We use the approach in Evans (2010) to minimize
incubation bias by excluding returns from the period before a fund received a
ticker17 from NASDAQ. To reduce the regression estimation error, we focus
on active funds with more than 60 observations, as is standard in the litera-
ture. This gives us 5589 active funds (635 sector, 4954 non-sector funds) in
an unbalanced panel from January 1992 to December 2016.
Table 2 presents average return rates in excess of the risk-free rate for the
different active fund types over the sample period from 1992 to 2016. For each
sector and month, the return rate of a fund type is computed by weighting
the return rates of the individual funds active in the specific month using
the associated AUM. Excess return rates are then computed by subtracting
the one-month T-bill rate for the respective month. An investor could set
up such sector portfolios only at high cost, because of shareclass fees and
rebalancing cost.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 shows average monthly gross and net returns for sector and di-
versified funds and for Dow Jones sector indices and the general Dow Jones
index. The sector portfolios generally have higher return rates than diversi-
fied portfolios at both gross and net level. When compared to the average
return rate of the sector-appropriate Dow Jones index, only six out of 11
of the notional sector active fund portfolios produced larger average net re-
turns. These sectors are health care, consumer goods, consumer services,
industrial, materials and telecommunication. The real estate sector funds
equal the Dow Jones sector index. For diversified funds, the picture is worse,
with only one fund type, mid cap, having net returns in excess of the general
Dow Jones index.
Compared to their passive counterparts, nine out of 11 active fund sectors
produce higher returns.18 In contrast, only two out of seven active diversified
fund types outperform their passive counterparts, and one equals it. Given
17A ticker is an abbreviation used to uniquely identify publicly traded shares of a par-
ticular stock on a stock market.
18The passive funds may provide gross return rates lower than the Dow Jones index
because of the different indexes they track.
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these results and that active funds are likely to take on extra risk, there is
little initial evidence that many of the active fund managers have real talents
to outperform the market on the risk-adjusted basis.
In the next section, we assess different potential benchmarks, and then
report our results using our preferred benchmark, the Carhart four factor
model with the liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). The time
series observations for the risk factors are from French’s and Pastor’s web-
pages. We do not provide summary statistics here.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 The Benchmark Model
We tested a variety of potential benchmark models for the sector and diver-
sified funds using value-weighted portfolios of both passive and active funds.
If a pricing model explains the expected returns of an asset, the intercept in
the time series regression of the asset’s excess returns on the model’s factors
would be indistinguishable from zero (Fama and French 2018). We ran the
regressions on panels of portfolio types and a variety of benchmark models.19
The coefficient t-statistic estimates were adjusted using heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation robust standard errors (Kiefer and Vogelsang 2002).
Table 3 shows the results for the joint tests that alpha is zero for pas-
sive funds, and for active funds. We also consider, separately, sector funds,
cap-based funds and style-based funds as we use these categories to con-
sider the impact on performance of outsourcing and team management. If
the benchmark is appropriate for assessing risk-adjusted performance, and if
some active fund portfolios deliver outperformance, we would expect the test
to be significant for active funds and insignificant for passive funds. We seek
a benchmark that meets these criteria for all funds and for the three fund
categories.
For the active portfolios, all benchmark models have non-zero alphas for
all funds and for the three separate categories. For the passive portfolios, only
for the Carhart model, with an added liquidity factor, do we fail to reject
the null hypothesis of zero alphas for all funds and for the three separate
categories. Accordingly, we adopt it as the benchmark.20
19We also tested the benchmarks using the approach of Chen et al. (2013), which is
based on the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973), and drew the same conclusion on the
preferred benchmark.
20We also undertook the subsequent analyses using the other benchmarks which had
failed some of the tests. The main inferences on the performance of different types of
funds remain qualitatively robust when these are used.
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[Table 3 about here]
.
5.2 Performance of the Fund Industry
We conducted the performance analysis for value-weighted portfolios of all
types of active funds. Table 4 shows the results for the gross and net monthly
alpha, risk factor loadings, and their associated t-statistics with Kiefer and
Vogelsang (2002) standard errors (in parentheses), from the regressions of
the Carhart plus liquidity model for all 18 fund types.
[Table 4 about here]
Overall, the the benchmark model is a better fit for the diversified fund
portfolios than for sector fund portfolios, as seen in the adjusted R-squared
ranging from 86% to 98% for diversified funds and 46% to 88% for sector
funds.
The Wald joint tests, that all gross or all net alphas equal zero, show
significant rejection of the null for both gross and net, implying that at least
one fund type can produce superior performance even after fees are deducted.
Some fund types clearly outperformed: healthcare, consumer services, indus-
trials and telecom were able to beat the market, net of fees. No sector fund
types had significantly negative net alphas. In contrast, for the diversified
funds, while five out of seven produced significantly positive gross alphas,
none did so for net returns, and alpha was significantly negative for growth
funds.
Most of the market betas are close to unity. The highest are tech (1.32)
and telecom (1.19), and the lowest are hedged (0.33) and utilities (0.66). All
others are in the range 0.72 to 1.01. Real estate, at 0.71, is the second lowest
for sector portfolios and the third lowest overall. In general, the market betas
for sectors funds are slightly higher that those for diversified funds, with an
average 0.92 against 0.85.
The coefficients, the risk factor loadings, on the size factor (SMB) among
sector fund portfolios are positive except for consumer goods, financial and
utilities, with the last two being significantly negative. For the diversified
fund portfolios, four of the SMB coefficients are positive and three negative,
all significantly so, suggesting, as would be expected, a wider range of invest-
ment strategies. Real estate funds, at 0.34, have the second highest SMB
loading of the sector portfolios, but mid, micro and small cap portfolios all
have higher SMB loadings. Overall, this confirms a size tilt towards smaller
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companies in these portfolios and is consistent with the findings in most
REMFs studies that REMFs are mostly small-cap (Chiang et al. 2008).
For the value risk factor (HML), eight out of 11 sector fund portfolios have
positive loadings (of which six are significantly so), and three are negative
(all significant). For the diversified funds, three out of seven are positive
(two significant) and three are negative (all three significant) and one is zero.
For sector portfolios, the range is -0.81 to 0.66, with real estate, at 0.56, the
second highest overall; for diversified portfolios, the range is less, -0.26 to
0.25.
For the momentum factor (MOM), three sector fund portfolios have pos-
itive loadings (two significant) and eight are negative (six significant). For
diversified fund portfolios, four are positive (three significant) and three are
negative (two significant). The loadings are generally low, for diversified fund
portfolios all are within the range -0.03 to 0.07, and those for sector funds
have a wider range, from -0.11 to 0.12, perhaps suggesting the different sec-
tor conditions. For real estate, it is -0.06, which is the second equal most
negative..
Finally, for the liquidity risk factor (LIQ), five sector fund portfolios have
positive loadings (two significant) and three negative (two significant), and
three are zero; and for the diversified fund portfolios, four are positive (two
significant) and three are zero. The loadings are very low: for sector funds,
the range is -0.05 to 0.09; and for diversified funds, it is trivial, 0.00 to 0.01.
Real estate is -0.03 while healthcare, at -0.5, is the only other negative and
significant loading. This lends some weight to the findings by Subrahmanyam
(2007) and DiBartolomeo et al. (2020) that the REIT and non-REIT markets
are affected differently by liquidity shocks.
When the correlations between alpha and the factors are considered, there
are no significant results. And the only significant correlation between factors
is the market beta with the SMB factor (0.37). This confirms that alpha is
measuring something other than that measured by the load factors.
And when the factor loadings of REMFs are correlated with those of other
fund types, the correlations are strongest with industrials (0.89), materials
(0.88), financial services (0.86), resources (0.84) and consumer goods (0.78).
No other correlations are above 0.75. Three are below 0.50: telecom (0.45),
healthcare (0.42) and technology (0.34). Those with diversified funds are all
in the range 0.50-0.75.
Overall, these results indicate a broad difference in the investment strate-
gies between sector and diversified funds but also important differences within
these groups. While REMFs have the expected characteristics, they do not
stand out as particularly different from most other sector funds.
Next, we consider the estimated alphas for each fund type in non-overlapping
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five-year and three-year periods to establish if out- and underperformance in
one period persists to the next period. We have 18 funds and five or eight
periods, so there are, respectively, 72 or 126 possible opportunities for per-
sistence in returns. The results are shown in Table 5 and Table 6.
[Table 5, Table 6 about here]
For the five-year periods, we identify only one case of persistence: for micro
cap, significant gross out-performance in 1992-6 is followed by significant net
out-performance in 1997-2001. For the three-year periods, we also find only
one: again for micro cap, with significant gross out-performance in 1998-2000
followed by significant net out-performance in 2001-3. Thus, once expenses
are taken into account, there are no examples of persistence in performance.
In the final analysis of this section, we consider the estimated alphas for
each fund type in rolling windows of five years.21 We do so as we expect
that different fund types will be affected differently by different aspects of
economic fundamentals and the business cycle, and that sector funds are
prone to sector-specific factors. It is also possible that the extent of market
competition and the number of skilled managers in the different fund types
may vary during different periods (Barras et al. 2010). Our interest is in the
time patterns of excess returns as much as in the statistical significance. The
results are shown in Figure 2.
There are two striking features from this analysis: first, the estimated
alphas for the diversified funds are close to zero and are much less variable
than for the sector funds; and, second, the sector fund alphas, generally,
vary between positive and then negative for lengthy periods, which differ
by sector. This is what might be expected as diversified funds are more
resistant to shocks and are able to move investments according to actual or
expected changes in the investment environment. In contrast, sector funds
must retain their sector composition and so are exposed to sector specific
factors that persist. Overall, these results are consistent with a view that
outperformance is soon competed away and that there are systematic factors
that affect all funds of a particular type.
[Figure 2 about here]
5.3 Performance of Individual Funds
We now report the results of the analysis of individual funds, and we focus on
the alphas. Recall that we need to calculate q-values of each fund to control
21We also examined three year rolling windows but, as the results are not materially
different, we do not present them here.
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for false discovery among multiple testing. For each fund, we estimate the
one-sided p-values from Eq. 7 based on t-statistics estimated from the wild
bootstrap. After using Eq. 822 to calculate q-values of each active fund, we
apply 20%, 10% and 5% significance levels to test for significantly positive
alphas with false positives controlled for. A fund is considered skilled and free
from false discoveries once it has a q-value less than the chosen significance
level. We aggregate the number of skilled funds by their fund types, and
present the percentage of funds with q-values less than 20%, 10%, and 5%
in columns three to five in Table 7. To compare the findings of conventional
t-tests before we control for false discoveries, we also present the number of
funds with their bootstrapped p-values (one-sided) less than 5% in the last
column in Table 7.
[Table 7 about here]
Overall, only 5.80% of funds display skills at the gross returns level at
20%, and 1.84% at 5%, reducing to 0.79% in both cases, when fees are taken
into account. There is almost no difference between sector and diversified
funds as a whole. There are outperforming funds at the gross level in all
fund types but outperformance is concentrated. For active sector funds,
at the gross returns level, healthcare and technology are the sectors where
individual funds are most likely to outperform. There are 9.46% of the 74
healthcare funds and 8.76% of the 137 technology funds with their associated
q-values less than than 20%. These percentages reduce to 1.35% and 2.19%,
respectively, at a 5% significance level. For net returns, the percentages are
1.35% and 0.73%, respectively, at 20%, and the same at 5%.
For diversified funds, the best performing types are micro cap, hedged
and mid cap, with 24.00%, 13.64% and 11.37% showing skills at the 20%
significance level for gross returns, reducing to 8.08% 6.06% and 3.73% at
5%. When fees are taken into account, these figures reduce to 4.00%, 2.53%
and 2.35%, respectively, at both 20% and 5%.
Without false discoveries being controlled, we find that the number of
skilled funds derived from the individual t-tests is inflated by falsely treating
lucky funds as skilled. The more funds included in the fund category, the
more severe is false discovery. The number of truly skilled growth funds (net
of expenses) reduces from 232 to 44, once the false discovery rate of 20% is
applied.
Turning now specifically to the real estate sector, once we have controlled
for false discoveries and expenses have been deducted, only one of the 173
funds can be regarded as skilled at both 20% and 5% significance. However,
22Please go to Appendix A.2 and A.3 for more details.
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in total, there are only five sector funds with skills, and no more than one
from each sector. Thus, there is no evidence of real estate being any different
from other sector funds.
We now consider the estimated alphas for individual funds, in non-overlapping
five-year and three-year periods, to establish if outperformance in one period
persists to the next period. First, we consider persistence within each fund
type, that is, whether there are any outperforming funds of each type in
successive time periods. However, it is possible that the outperforming funds
of a particular type are different in successive periods and that fund flows
can compete away the alpha for individual funds (Barras et al. 2010). So, we
then consider whether specific funds outperform in successive periods. For
each sub-period, we only include funds with more than 60 observations and
repeat the procedures to derive their q-values.
The results are shown in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10. Table 8 presents
the results for persistence between five-year periods for any funds within a
type. For gross performance at a q-value of 20%, some funds in growth and
small cap appear in all periods, some funds in growth & income and mid cap
appear until the final five year period and some funds in hedged, micro cap
and income appear in two consecutive periods. However, when fees are taken
into account, only small cap (1992-6 to 1997-2001), micro cap (1997-2001 to
2002-6) and hedged (2007-11 to 2012-16) show persistent performance. In
all three cases, only one fund is involved. There is no evidence of persistence
among any sector funds at either gross or net levels.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 9 shows the results of the same analysis for three-year periods. For
gross returns, there are 28 separate instances of outperformance in consecu-
tive periods. Growth & income accounts for seven of these and appears in
every one of the eight three-year periods; mid cap has four consecutive in-
stances (five consecutive periods of outperformance); growth has a sequence
of three instances and a separate sequence of two; hedged has three instances;
small cap has two separate sequences of two; tech has two instances; and in-
come, real estate and resources have one each. For net outperformance, there
are three sequences of three for growth & income and mid cap; and one each
for growth and real estate. Again, the evidence of persistence among sector
funds is less than among diversified funds.
[Table 9 about here]
We now turn to persistence of performance of individual funds rather
than of funds within a fund type. The results are shown in Table 10 and are
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striking. At a q-value of 20%, for net out-performance, there is persistence
only between 1992-4 and 1995-7, and only for two individual funds, one
growth & income fund and one growth fund.
[Table 10 about here]
Overall, these analyses in the last two sections suggest:
• There is evidence of gross outperformance of portfolios of most fund
types for the study period as a whole but only for four types of sector
funds when fees are considered.
• The outperformance is concentrated in periods of three or five years and
there is no persistence beyond the initial period of out-performance.
• The outperformance is heavily concentrated in a small number of funds
- fewer than six percent of funds outperform at a gross level and fewer
than one percent (44 funds out of 5589) at a net level.
• Within some types of diversified funds, there is some limited evidence
of persistence of significant positive performance of that type of fund
but not of individual funds.
• Diversified funds differ from sector funds in that they exhibit some
limited persistence of significant positive performance within fund types
but we identified only two such funds with persistent out-performance
in successive periods.
• There is evidence of sector funds having a period of positive perfor-
mance followed by a period of negative performance.
• Persistence, where it exists, seems either to be competed away quickly
or to be linked to systematic factors affecting a fund type and not to
the specific skills of individual managers.
• REMFs are no different from other sector funds.
5.4 Robustness Checks on Fund Performance
We implemented a series of sensitivity tests to examine whether our con-
clusions on active sector and diversified funds’ performance are robust to
the funds’ sample selection, benchmark choices, inter-fund dependency, and
other multiple testing approaches.23 The sample selection test consists of
23Results on robustness checks are available from the authors on request.
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changing the required number of observations to 36, 48 and 72. We find the
results remain qualitatively similar, and only marginally different from the
findings for the sample with the requirement of 60 observations. To examine
the sensitivity of performance to specifications of the benchmark, we em-
ployed all other factor models which passed the tests summarised in Table
3. The results remain robust.
Finally, the method for utilizing false discovery rates in this study is from
Storey (2002), Storey et al. (2004). It assumes the p-values are independent
or weakly dependent.24 Romano et al. (2008) propose a procedure to control
false discoveries under weak assumptions that incorporate information about
the dependence structure of the test statistics. Since cross-fund correlation
among return rates is less of a problem for mutual funds compared to hedge
funds, we do not consider the control for cross-fund dependence among all ac-
tive funds. However, we examine the time-series autocorrelation among each
fund returns, by implementing the bootstrapped p-values generated from the
stationary block bootstrap in Politis and Romano (1994). We compare the
bootstrapped results with block length as 2, ..., 10. Overall, the inferences
on results remain robust.
We also implement the Bonferroni method to control for false discoveries
among active funds, since it is the most familiar multiple testing approach.
Using this approach, we reject the null if the p-value 6 α/N , where N is the
number of funds. The disadvantage of the Bonferroni method is that it is
strong, resulting in loss of power. Nonetheless, after applying the Bonferroni
bound, we find the number of skilled funds reduces significantly, from 232
to 2 at net alpha level, and from 419 to 9 at gross alpha level (α = 5%).
However, the result on which fund types are skilled remains robust.
5.5 The Impact of Outsourcing and Team Manage-
ment on Fund Performance
The results presented in this section use the same basic method as Chen et al.
(2013), as set out in the Methodology section, but there are differences in our
research questions and in the approach. We do not consider bond funds, but
we do consider sector funds, in particular, we consider REMFs separately;
we divide diversified funds into cap-based funds and style funds; and we also
consider team- versus individually-managed funds.
24According to Storey et al. (2004), weak dependence is defined as dependence in finite
blocks, ergodic dependence and certain mixing distributions. The assumption of indepen-
dent p-values can be replaced with weakly dependent p-values when the number of testings
or sample is large.
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Table 11 shows the time series averages of the cross-section estimates
of the coefficients estimated using Eq. 12 for all funds and, separately, for
REMFs, other non-RE sector funds, style-based funds and cap-based funds.25
The left panel shows the results of the analysis using eight portfolios of funds,
sorted by type (four) and whether outsourced or in-house; and the right panel
shows the results by type and whether the fund is team- or individually-
managed.26 27
For the sorting by in-house/outsourced, the coefficient on Outsource is
statistically insignificant for non-RE sector funds. In contrast, it is nega-
tive and statistically significant for all funds together and for the other fund
types. Thus, overall, funds with outsourced fund management underper-
formed funds with in-house management by 2.2 basis points per month, or
-0.26% annually. For fund types, the annual figures are -0.11% for style-
based funds, -0.70% for cap-based funds and -1.1% for REMFs. For the
sorting by team/individually-managed, the figures are similar, respectively,
-0.29% overall, -0.20% style-based funds, -0.59% for cap-based funds and
-0.70% for REMFs.28
The results suggest that managers of outsourced non-RE sector funds
have the same skills as in-house managers. However, caution is required
in drawing inferences from the relatively small REMF sample.29 Possible
explanations for the overall result include a classic principal-agent problem
between the fund family and the out-sourced managers, and possible pref-
erential treatment of the in-house managed funds. Despite the difference in
outcomes, the proportion of outsourcing among sector and diversified funds
is similar at around 20%.
[Table 11 about here]
Whether a fund is team- or individually-managed is also a factor to con-
sider when attributing performance. Funds managed by a team may per-
25The sizes of the available cross-section and the time series mean that it is only possible
to separate out REMFs within the sector funds.
26We found that the results remain qualitatively the same when different benchmark
models are used.
27We also examined the earlier period from 1984 and found the results remain qualita-
tively the same for diversified funds. We could not replicate the analysis for sectors funds
for this earlier period as sector fund industry began to be important only from the early
1990s, so the sample size is too small.
28These figures compare with a range of -0.50% to -0.74% for all funds, depending on
the benchmark used, in Chen et al. (2013). However, they include bond funds and exclude
sector funds.
29Indeed, as discussed below, when further control variables are added, and the sample
sizes are further reduced, there is no difference between REMFs which are managed in-
house and those which are outsourced
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form better than those managed by individual managers, as a result of being
relatively free of constraints of resources and networks. However, a team-
management structure is typically considered to be less efficient in terms
of the coordination of personnel and organisation. We find no significant
differences between team- and individually-managed funds either when we
sort by outsourcing or by team management. This is true overall and for
all types of funds. This confirms the results of both Bliss et al. (2008) and
Massa et al. (2010) who find no significant difference between team-managed
and individually-managed funds. In contrast, Patel and Sarkissian (2017),
who argue that their data are of better quality than other studies, find that
team-managed funds out-perform by 30-40 basis points, with maximum out-
performance from teams of three.
We turn now to the control variables included in the analysis.30 Fund
size is consistently significantly negative for all funds and for each fund type.
Larger funds perform worse but the effect is smallest for REMFs. Although
we include sector funds and exclude bond funds, and we have 40 rather than
20 portfolios, our results for the coefficients are broadly similar to those of
Chen et al. (2013) although the significance of their result depends on the
benchmark used. More generally in the literature, there is no conclusive
finding on the effect of fund size on performance. Large funds may have
advantages over smaller ones owing to economies of scale from allocating
costs over a larger asset base but, on the other hand, they may also face
potential dis-economies of scale. Chen et al. (2004) find that fund returns
decrease with the lagged fund size. They suggest that liquidity may be an
important reason explaining why size erodes performance.
We also include the number of funds in the family of which a fund is a
member and the value of other funds in the family. The former is significant
and positive for cap-based funds, whether the sorting is by outsourced or
team, but otherwise is insignificant. Chen et al. (2013) find number of funds
to be insignificant for all benchmarks. The difference may be because they do
not undertake their analysis by fund type or because of their different choice
of fund types and different time period. Thus, our finer sorting produces a
30In the reported version, we do not include fund turnover, loads and 12b fees as con-
trols because there are missing data. When turnover and loads are included, the mini-
mum/maximum sample (depending on the year) overall falls from 1415/2821 to 666/1931;
and when 12b fees are included to 344/1415. The REMFs sample falls from 24/105 to
11/70 and then to 8/51. When turnover and loads are included outsourced becomes in-
significant for REMFs; number of family funds becomes insignificant for cap-based funds;
and age becomes insignificant for style-based funds an all funds. When 12b fees are added,
outsourced becomes only marginally significant, at around 10%, for all funds for both pan-
els; and flow becomes significant and negative for non-RE sectors funds. We attribute these
changes to sample size and composition although the key results remain largely unaffected.
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new result for cap-based funds.
The latter, family fund size, is significant and positive for all funds, for
non-RE sector funds and for style-based funds, in both sortings. Overall, a
fund which belongs to a large fund family does better. Chen et al. (2013)
find this variable to be significant and positive. Their coefficient values (for
a range of benchmarks) are larger than ours, except that our non-RE sector
coefficient is about twice the size, suggesting another difference for sector
funds, which are not in their analysis.
We find the expenses ratio to be insignificant at 5% for all fund types
in both sortings. Chen et al. (2013) also find it to be highly insignificant.
The impact of expenses on fund performance is typically considered to be
negative, since they are regarded as the price paid by investors to fund man-
agers. Some studies find evidence supporting a negative relationship between
expenses and performance before or net of expenses (Carhart 1997, Gil-Bazo
and Ruiz-Verdú 2009). But Chen et al. (2004) find no statistically significant
relationship between expenses and performance.
The coefficient for age is positive but only significant at 10% and only
for all funds and non-RE sector funds, when sorted by outsourced/in-house,
and additionally for style-based funds when sorted by team/individually-
managed.31 Chen et al. (2013) find age to be highly insignificant. More
generally, the literature is inconclusive on the relationship between fund age
and performance. A younger fund may be more at risk of failure owing to lack
of experience but may also be more likely to outperform by taking larger risks.
Ferreira et al. (2013) find no significant relation between age and performance
for funds invested inside the U.S. but a negative relationship between age
and fund performance for funds invested outside of the U.S., with younger
funds performing better. However, in contrast, Chuprinin et al. (2015) find
a significantly positive relationship between international fund performance
and age.
The next variable is fund flow. According to the ‘smart money’ hypothe-
sis proposed by Gruber (1996), fund flow is positively related to future per-
formance because investors can detect and reward the skilled managers by
investing in them. His empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. Ferreira
31For fund size, number of funds in the family, value of the other funds in the family
and age, we tested for concave or convex relationships by adding the squared variable. In
both sortings, there was an effect only for age, and only for all funds and for style-based
funds. In the former case, the linear term was significant at 5% and the squared term was
significant at 10% and, in the latter case, both linear terms were significant only at 10%,
and the squared terms at 10% and 12%. In these cases, the overall effect was positive
and increasing until during year four, thereafter, the effect decreased and became negative
during year seven.
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et al. (2013) find that the smart money effect is more evident in the global
market, suggesting that investors are better at detecting skilled managers
outside of the U.S. We find no significant evidence supporting this hypothe-
sis for either sorting or for sector or diversified funds. In contrast, Chen et al.
(2013) find significantly negative results for all five of their benchmarks, al-
though, to three decimal places, the coefficients are zero so, as the variable
is measured as a percentage, are not of economic significance.
The final variable is the cumulative return during the previous 12 months.
We find no significant results, in contrast to Chen et al. (2013) who find a
significantly positive result for all five benchmarks.
We also undertook the analysis using fixed effects for adviser company
and fund family instead of fund family number and fund family size. As there
were around 780 advisers and a similar number of fund families, sample size
restrictions meant that we could not undertake the analysis separately for
REMFs and non-RE sector funds. Table 12 presents the results for all funds.
This analysis confirms our overall results for outsourcing, with an annual
underperformance of just under -0.5%. It also confirms the result for firm
size and the marginal result for age.
[Table 12 about here]
Our key results are:
• Outsourcing has no effect on the performance of non-RE sector funds.
• In contrast, it has a negative effect on the performance of all other fund
categories. However, caution is required for the REMFs result as the
sample size is small and, when additional control variables are added
and the sample size is further reduced, it becomes insignificant.
• There are no significant differences between team- and individually-
managed funds for any fund type.
The clear difference between sector and non-sector funds for outsourcing
is a new result in the literature and justifies our approach of considering
fund type. A possible explanation lies in the sizes of the funds and their
fund families. Table 13 shows that, on average, non-RE sector funds are less
than half of the size of style-based funds and similar in size to cap-based funds
and REMFs. However, their fund families have around 50% more funds than
the other categories, and the TNA of their fund families is between three
and six times larger. Sector funds are also half as likely to be team-managed
(13% compared to roughly 26%), and less so (5%) if they are outsourced.
They also have much larger percentage fund flows.
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It is likely that highly specialized skills are required for managing sector
funds and only very large fund families would have the capacity to develop
these skills in-house. This probably explains why those fund families that
manage their sector funds in-house are over twice the size of those which out-
source. Nonetheless, even the fund families that outsource the management
of sector funds are significantly larger than other fund families, suggesting a
strong market position.
Companies which undertake the outsourced management also require spe-
cialist skills and have to focus on small market segments, providing specialist
services to large organisations which have a strong market position and which
are more likely to have significant oversight capacity. Thus, companies that
manage the outsourced funds need to perform well, so the skills differences
between in-house and outsourced managers should be less, and the principal-
agent problems may be reduced.
[Table 13 about here]
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have examined the performance of REMFs within the con-
text of all fund types, both sector and diversified, to see whether their fund
managers are skilled. To do so, we used as a benchmark the Carhart four-
factor model with an added liquidity factor, and examined the performance,
both gross and net, of the active funds by type and individually. We have
added to the literature by separating skills from luck through use of a wild
bootstrap, and by controlling for false discoveries, where we have demon-
strated that the conventional approach produces more favourably positive
results. We have also examined the time-dependency of performance and
persistence during successive sub-periods. Finally, we considered the impact
on performance of outsourcing and team management and established a new
result in the literature.
Our key results are as follows.
• The Carhart plus liquidity model captures the cross-sectional return
variations of the fund types.
• In the actively-managed mutual fund industry, seven out of 11 sectors,
and five out of eight diversified fund types, over the period 1992-2016,
displayed skills rather than luck in achieving out-performance. This
reduces to four out of 11 and none out of eight, respectively, after
consideration of fees.
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• There is evidence of significant lack of skills, rather than bad luck, in
the growth & income fund type for net returns.
• The out-performance of fund types is concentrated in periods of five
or three years and there is no persistence beyond the initial period of
out-performance.
• At the individual fund level, we found little evidence for the existence
of skills, after deduction of fees. Across all fund types only 5.8% (324)
gross and 0.8% (44 funds out of 5589) net of funds display skills. The
result is the same for sector and diversified funds. Only five sector funds
demonstrate out-performance and only one of these is a real estate fund.
• When we examined individual fund performance in five-year and three-
year periods, it was clear that, generally, significant skills did not per-
sist. Of the sector funds, only real estate showed any persistence of
net out-performance. Within several types of diversified funds, there is
evidence of persistence of gross and net out-performance of that type
of fund but not of individual funds. We identified only two individual
diversified funds with out-performance in successive periods.
• The analysis using rolling windows showed relative stability of the per-
formance of portfolios of diversified funds but that portfolios of sector
funds tended to have lengthy periods of poor or good performance.
Thus, persistence would appear to be linked to systematic factors af-
fecting a fund type and not to the specific skills of individual managers.
It also seems likely that competition, with market maturity, drives out
abnormal returns in all fund types.
• Outsourcing has no effect on the performance of sector funds but a
negative impact on cap-based and style-based funds. We attribute this
to a smaller principal-agent problem in sector funds and to a lesser
differentiation in skills levels. There is some evidence that REMFs are
different from other sector funds but this result relies on a small sample
and is sensitive to the control variables included.
• In contrast, whether a fund is team- or individually-managed makes no
difference to performance for any type of fund.
• Overall, there is little to suggest that REMFs are different from other
sector funds.
These findings are consistent with other findings in the literature that
the evidence for outperformance is weak, both for the mutual fund industry
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as a whole and, specifically, for the real estate sector. So, to answer the
question in our title - the real estate sector is not better than other sector
funds. Nor do diversified funds generally fare better. Few individual funds
have demonstrated skills to produce outperformance, and some even display
sufficient lack of skills so as to generate significant underperformance.
The results raise some general issues about the structure of the investment
market. From an institutional economics perspective, the current structure
should reflect the minimisation of transaction costs and access to specialist
information and skills by fund managers. There is no strong evidence of
the latter so, why do these funds exist? It is perhaps easier to construct an
argument for sector funds.
From the behavioral finance perspective, the proliferation of sector funds
could be regarded as the product of marketing strategies used by fund man-
agement companies to exploit investors’ heterogeneity, such as sector prefer-
ences and risk appetites (Massa 2003).
From the perspective of an active investor with a multi-sector portfolio,
sector mutual funds allow sector positions, either under- or over-weight, to
be taken quickly. As our results show that, unlike other fund types, non-RE
sector funds do not suffer when outsourcing is used, investors need not factor
outsourcing into their choice of fund. So, if the multi-sector managers believe
they have forecasting skills, but not stock selection skills, they could adopt
this approach. As some sector markets do outperform in some periods, this
appears to be a defensible strategy.
However, as most funds within a sector do not outperform, either skills
are required in manager selection, or a wide and diversified range of funds
should be held in the sector portfolio, or investment should be in passive
rather than active funds. The first of these would not appear prudent as
the performance of individual funds is not persistent, and manager selection
skills are required; the second requires a diversified portfolio of funds within
a sector; whereas the third would be easier to achieve. This conclusion has
to be qualified as, net of fees, for nine of the 11 sectors, a portfolio of active
funds outperforms one of passive funds. We note a general trend to a higher
proportion of passive funds, and that this is greater among sector funds.
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A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Fund Type and Acronyms: There are 11 types of sector funds. Sec-
tor funds invest primarily in companies engaged in Healthcare, Consumer goods,
Consumer services, Financial services, Industrials, Basic materials, Real estate,
Natural resources, Technology, Telecommunication, Utilities. The non-sector di-
versified active funds consist of seven types, including four types of style funds:
the Growth & income funds, Growth funds, Hedged funds, Income funds, and three
types of cap-based funds: Mid cap, Small cap funds, Micro cap funds.
Type Acronym Description
Sector CARE Healthcare Healthcare, medicine, and biotechnology
Sector CONG Consumer goods Manufacturing, distributing consumer goods
Sector CONS Consumer services Consumer services related activities
Sector FINS Financial services Financial services related activities
Sector INDU Industrials Manufacturing, distributing capital goods, etc
Sector MATR Materials Manufacturing chemicals, construction materials, etc
Sector REAL Real estate Real estate industry related activities
Sector RSOU Natural resources Natural resources related activities
Sector TCOM Telecommunication
Development, manufacture, sales of telecom services or
equipments
Sector TECH Technology Science and technology
Sector UTIL Utilities Utilities related activities
Style GRIN Growth & income
Combine a growth-of-earnings orientation and an income
requirement for level and/or rising dividends
Style GROW Growth
Companies with long-term earnings expected to grow
significantly faster than the earnings of the stocks
represented in the major stock indices
Style HEDG Hedged Aim for positive returns in all market conditions
Style INCO Income
Seek high income by investing primarily in
dividend-paying equity securities
Cap MDCA Mid cap Companies with market capitalizations less than $5 billion
Cap MICA Micro cap
Companies with market capitalizations less than $300
million
Cap SMCA Small cap Companies with market capitalizations less than $1 billion
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Table 2: Average Performance of Mutual Funds: Ta-
ble reports averages of monthly return rates r of notional fund
portfolios in excess of the risk-free rate over the period from
1992 to 2016. The one month T-bill rate is used as the risk-
free rate. The notional fund portfolio return rates are averages
of the return rates of all funds that existed in a given month in
the respective fund type. The value-weighted (VW) portfolio
return rates weight the individual rates with the fund’s assets
under management. The average return rates are reported sep-
arately for actively and for passively managed fund,s and for
return rates before (gross) and after (net) the deduction of
manager expenses. The ‘DJ Index’ column gives the average
excess return rates over the Dow Jones (DJ) stock index for
the respective sector or general market.
Type* Active funds Passive funds DJ Index
Gross r Net r Gross r Net r
Sector CARE 0.87 0.79 0.55 0.51 0.70
Sector CONG 0.82 0.71 0.42 0.39 0.46
Sector CONS 0.96 0.85 0.60 0.57 0.64
Sector FINS 0.86 0.74 0.39 0.36 0.81
Sector INDU 0.97 0.86 0.55 0.52 0.68
Sector MATR 0.82 0.71 0.59 0.56 0.57
Sector REAL 0.83 0.73 0.79 0.77 0.73
Sector RSOU 0.83 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.77
Sector TCOM 0.90 0.80 0.13 0.09 0.47
Sector TECH 0.93 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.96
Sector UTIL 0.61 0.51 0.62 0.58 0.56
Style GRIN 0.58 0.51 0.62 0.59 0.74
Style GROW 0.63 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.74
Style HEDG 0.31 0.22 1.18 1.06 0.74
Style INCO 0.61 0.55 0.62 0.60 0.74
Cap MDCA 0.73 0.64 0.79 0.77 0.74
Cap MICA 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.74
Cap SMCA 0.83 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.74
* See details in Table 1.
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Table 3: Asset Pricing Test of Value-weighted Portfolio of Sector and
Non-sector Funds Relative to Factor Models: This table shows the joint
alpha test based on panel regression output of passive and active sector and non-
sector portfolio gross return relative to different risk factor models during 1992 to
2016. The t-statistic estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation robust (Kiefer and Vogelsang 2002) standard errors. P-values of the Wald
χ2 statistics are presented in parentheses.
Models Passive funds Active funds
All funds
FF3 18.19 (0.44) 3292.02 (0.00)
FF3 + Liquid 15.69 (0.61) 3354.31 (0.00)
Carhart 19.32 (0.37) 2441.22 (0.00)
Carhart+Liquid 17.91 (0.46) 2760.72 (0.00)
Carhart+Liquid,Sec 27.18 (0.08) 3090.61 (0.00)
FF5 35.71 (0.01) 3357.11 (0.00)
FF5 + Liquid 27.85 (0.06) 3394.36 (0.00)
FF5 + Sector 50.65 (0.00) 3756.46 (0.00)
FF5 + MOM,Liq,Sec 26.61 (0.09) 3300.64 (0.00)
Sector funds
FF3 12.11 (0.36) 410.03 (0.00)
FF3 + Liquid 8.83 (0.64) 551.04 (0.00)
Carhart 12.32 (0.34) 411.42 (0.00)
Carhart+Liquid 10.75 (0.46) 594.10 (0.00)
Carhart+Liquid,Sec 29.23 (0.00) 1075.70 (0.00)
FF5 19.68 (0.05) 1079.20 (0.00)
FF5 + Liquid 7.49 (0.76) 2052.54 (0.00)
FF5 + Sector 22.50 (0.02) 3724.78 (0.00)
FF5 + MOM,Liq,Sec 25.08 (0.00) 3082.39 (0.00)
Style funds
FF3 20.34 (0.00) 381.87 (0.00)
FF3 + Liquid 14.40 (0.01) 253.17 (0.00)
Carhart 13.51 (0.01) 283.25 (0.00)
Carhart+Liquid 7.66 (0.11) 138.07 (0.00)
FF5 39.83 (0.00) 201.65 (0.00)
FF5 + Liquid 28.73 (0.00) 100.77 (0.00)
FF5 + MOM,Liq 23.72 (0.00) 90.48 (0.00)
Cap-based funds
FF3 2.72 (0.43) 27.38 (0.00)
FF3 + Liquid 2.94 (0.41) 14.33 (0.00)
Carhart 3.96 (0.27) 24.85 (0.00)
Carhart+Liquid 3.24 (0.36) 21.98 (0.00)
FF5 11.37 (0.01) 23.95 (0.00)
FF5 + Liquid 15.08 (0.00) 36.19 (0.00)




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: All Active Funds with Bootstrapped q-value≤20%, 10%, 5%:
Presents the total number of funds for fund type (Total #) and associated per-
centage of funds with their alpha t-statistic q-values ≤20%, 10%, and 5%, for each
fund type. The last column shows the percentage of funds with their bootstrapped
p-values less than 5% significance level (p 6 5%) for each type.
Type Total # Percent (q 6 20%) Percent (q 6 10%) Percent (q 6 5%) p 6 5%
Positive Gross Alpha
CARE 74 9.46% 1.35% 1.35% 9.46%
CONG 22 4.55% 0.00% 0.00% 4.55%
CONS 9 22.22% 0.00% 0.00% 22.22%
FINS 50 8.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00%
INDU 13 7.69% 0.00% 0.00% 15.38%
MATR 5 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00%
REAL 173 1.73% 1.16% 0.58% 1.73%
RSOU 87 2.30% 0.00% 0.00% 2.30%
TCOM 15 6.67% 6.67% 6.67% 6.67%
TECH 137 8.76% 2.19% 0.73% 12.41%
UTIL 50 4.00% 4.00% 2.00% 4.00%
GRIN 1182 4.31% 2.12% 1.44% 5.41%
GROW 2005 3.74% 2.00% 1.45% 5.34%
HEDG 198 13.64% 7.07% 6.06% 16.16%
INCO 210 8.10% 3.81% 1.43% 10.00%
MDCA 510 11.37% 5.49% 3.73% 15.49%
MICA 50 24.00% 10.00% 8.00% 26.00%
SMCA 799 6.01% 2.88% 1.75% 7.63%
Sum 5589 5.80% 2.72% 1.84% 7.50%
Positive Net Alpha
CARE 74 1.35% 1.35% 1.35% 8.11%
CONG 22 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CONS 9 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FINS 50 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.00%
INDU 13 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.69%
MATR 5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00%
REAL 173 0.58% 0.58% 0.58% 1.73%
RSOU 87 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.30%
TCOM 15 6.67% 6.67% 6.67% 20.00%
TECH 137 0.73% 0.73% 0.73% 9.49%
UTIL 50 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 6.00%
GRIN 1182 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 3.21%
GROW 2005 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 2.59%
HEDG 198 2.53% 2.53% 2.53% 7.07%
INCO 210 0.48% 0.48% 0.48% 3.81%
MDCA 510 2.35% 2.35% 2.35% 8.82%
MICA 50 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 20.00%
SMCA 799 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 3.75%
Sum 5589 0.79% 0.79% 0.79% 4.15%
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Table 8: All Active Funds with Bootstrapped q-value≤20%, 10%, 5%
during Five-year Subperiods: Presents the total number of funds for fund type
(Total #) and associated percentage (%) for funds with their alpha t-statistic q-
values ≤20%, 10%, and 5% for each fund type.
Type Total # % (20% gro) % (20% net) % (10% gro) % (10% net) % (5% gro) % (5% net)
1992 to 1996
CARE 10 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
GRIN 237 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GROW 355 3.10% 0.28% 1.69% 0.28% 1.41% 0.28%
INCO 51 1.96% 0.00% 1.96% 0.00% 1.96% 0.00%
MDCA 53 3.77% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SMCA 94 9.57% 1.06% 5.32% 1.06% 1.06% 1.06%
1997 to 2001
TECH 32 6.25% 3.13% 3.13% 3.13% 3.13% 3.13%
GRIN 354 1.41% 0.00% 0.56% 0.00% 0.56% 0.00%
GROW 574 0.35% 0.00% 0.35% 0.00% 0.35% 0.00%
HEDG 10 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
MDCA 138 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72%
MICA 19 10.53% 5.26% 5.26% 5.26% 5.26% 5.26%
SMCA 228 1.32% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44%
2002 to 2006
CARE 47 2.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CONS 9 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FINS 35 2.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INDU 9 22.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
REAL 57 71.93% 1.75% 21.05% 1.75% 12.28% 1.75%
RSOU 31 3.23% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
TCOM 9 11.11% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00%
GRIN 429 4.20% 0.00% 2.56% 0.00% 1.17% 0.00%
GROW 818 4.16% 0.12% 2.57% 0.12% 1.22% 0.12%
INCO 76 1.32% 0.00% 1.32% 0.00% 1.32% 0.00%
MDCA 239 12.55% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
MICA 33 6.06% 3.03% 60.61% 3.03% 39.39% 3.03%
SMCA 371 3.77% 0.00% 2.16% 0.00% 1.08% 0.00%
2007 to 2011
GRIN 389 1.03% 0.00% 0.51% 0.00% 0.51% 0.00%
GROW 753 0.80% 0.00% 0.66% 0.00% 0.66% 0.00%
HEDG 46 8.70% 2.17% 6.52% 2.17% 6.52% 2.17%
INCO 96 4.17% 0.00% 1.04% 0.00% 1.04% 0.00%
MDCA 216 1.39% 0.00% 0.46% 0.00% 0.46% 0.00%
SMCA 334 0.60% 0.00% 0.30% 0.00% 0.30% 0.00%
2012 to 2016
FINS 26 3.85% 0.00% 3.85% 0.00% 3.85% 0.00%
REAL 118 0.85% 0.00% 0.85% 0.00% 0.85% 0.00%
TECH 58 1.72% 0.00% 1.72% 0.00% 1.72% 0.00%
GROW 992 0.40% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20%
HEDG 144 4.17% 0.69% 2.78% 0.69% 2.78% 0.69%
MICA 28 3.57% 0.00% 3.57% 0.00% 3.57% 0.00%
SMCA 411 0.24% 0.00% 0.24% 0.00% 0.24% 0.00%
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Table 9: All Active Funds with Bootstrapped q-value≤20%, 10%, 5%
during Three-year Subperiods: Presents the total number of funds for fund
type (Total #) and associated percentage (%) for funds with their alpha t-statistic
q-values ≤20%, 10%, and 5% for each fund type.
Type Total # % (20% gro) % (20% net) % (10% gro) % (10% net) % (5% gro) % (5% net)
1992 to 1994
CARE 10 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CONG 14 7.14% 0.00% 7.14% 0.00% 7.14% 0.00%
TECH 15 13.33% 0.00% 6.67% 0.00% 6.67% 0.00%
GRIN 265 1.89% 0.00% 1.13% 0.00% 1.13% 0.00%
GROW 414 4.11% 0.00% 2.42% 0.00% 2.42% 0.00%
INCO 54 3.70% 0.00% 1.85% 0.00% 1.85% 0.00%
MDCA 56 3.57% 0.00% 3.57% 0.00% 3.57% 0.00%
MICA 7 14.29% 0.00% 14.29% 0.00% 14.29% 0.00%
SMCA 95 12.63% 0.00% 7.37% 0.00% 7.37% 0.00%
1995 to 1997
GRIN 350 1.14% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29%
GROW 527 0.76% 0.38% 0.57% 0.38% 0.57% 0.38%
SMCA 212 0.94% 0.00% 0.47% 0.00% 0.47% 0.00%
1998 to 2000
CARE 23 8.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CONS 7 14.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FINS 25 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INDU 8 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
RSOU 33 3.03% 3.03% 3.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
TCOM 9 22.22% 22.22% 22.22% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00%
TECH 43 51.16% 34.88% 37.21% 13.95% 18.60% 6.98%
UTIL 27 7.41% 0.00% 3.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GRIN 444 13.96% 4.73% 5.86% 1.35% 3.60% 0.45%
GROW 706 12.75% 4.25% 5.38% 1.56% 2.41% 1.13%
HEDG 10 30.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
INCO 92 4.35% 2.17% 2.17% 1.09% 2.17% 0.00%
MDCA 176 15.91% 4.55% 6.25% 1.70% 2.27% 1.70%
MICA 25 32.00% 16.00% 16.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.00%
SMCA 310 10.65% 4.84% 5.16% 2.26% 3.23% 1.29%
2001 to 2003
CARE 46 4.35% 4.35% 4.35% 4.35% 4.35% 4.35%
GRIN 494 0.40% 0.20% 0.40% 0.20% 0.40% 0.20%
INCO 81 1.23% 0.00% 1.23% 0.00% 1.23% 0.00%
MDCA 240 0.83% 0.42% 0.83% 0.42% 0.83% 0.42%
2004 to 2006
CONS 9 11.11% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00%
FINS 36 2.78% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INDU 9 77.78% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
RSOU 32 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
TCOM 9 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11%
TECH 93 1.08% 1.08% 1.08% 1.08% 1.08% 1.08%
UTIL 21 19.05% 0.00% 4.76% 0.00% 4.76% 0.00%
GRIN 467 5.57% 0.21% 2.14% 0.21% 1.07% 0.21%
GROW 939 8.20% 0.53% 2.24% 0.43% 1.17% 0.32%
HEDG 43 9.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
MDCA 280 28.93% 5.36% 16.79% 4.29% 10.71% 3.21%
MICA 37 8.11% 0.00% 5.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SMCA 442 14.71% 2.26% 6.56% 2.04% 4.07% 1.58%
2007 to 2009
TECH 54 1.85% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
RSOU 39 2.56% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GRIN 452 1.33% 0.00% 0.22% 0.00% 0.22% 0.00%
GROW 878 3.76% 0.00% 1.03% 0.00% 0.57% 0.00%
HEDG 57 8.77% 0.00% 3.51% 0.00% 1.75% 0.00%
INCO 102 4.90% 0.00% 1.96% 0.00% 1.96% 0.00%
MDCA 259 7.34% 0.39% 1.93% 0.39% 0.77% 0.39%
SMCA 393 2.80% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2010 to 2012
CARE 36 19.44% 11.11% 13.89% 5.56% 8.33% 5.56%
REAL 116 1.72% 1.72% 1.72% 1.72% 1.72% 1.72%
TECH 62 1.61% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
UTIL 26 3.85% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GRIN 706 2.41% 1.84% 1.27% 0.99% 0.85% 0.99%
GROW 1142 1.49% 0.44% 0.70% 0.18% 0.44% 0.18%
HEDG 100 12.00% 7.00% 7.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
INCO 135 1.48% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
MDCA 300 1.00% 0.33% 0.33% 0.00% 0.33% 0.00%
SMCA 454 2.86% 0.22% 1.32% 0.22% 0.66% 0.22%
2013 to 2016
REAL 138 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72%
GRIN 896 0.11% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00%
GROW 1263 0.24% 0.00% 0.24% 0.00% 0.24% 0.00%
HEDG 262 1.15% 0.00% 1.15% 0.00% 1.15% 0.00%
MDCA 312 0.32% 0.00% 0.32% 0.00% 0.32% 0.00%
MICA 32 3.13% 0.00% 3.13% 0.00% 3.13% 0.00%46
Table 10: Persistence of All Active Funds: A fund has its q-value ≤ 20%
(or 10%, 5%) in two consecutive non-overlapping five-year/three-year periods is
reckoned as a persistent winner. We presents the total number of funds (Total
#) and associated percentage for funds with their gross and net alpha t-statistic
q-values ≤20% (or 10%, 5%) for each fund type, respectively.
Type Total # % (20% gro) % (20% net) % (10% gro) % (10% net) % (5% gro) % (5% net)
Five-year
1992 to 1996, 1997 to 2001
GROW 355 0.28% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00%
1997 to 2001, 2002 to 2006
GRIN 354 0.28% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00%
GROW 574 0.17% 0.00% 0.17% 0.00% 0.17% 0.00%
2002 to 2006, 2007 to 2011
- - - - - - -
2007 to 2011, 2012 to 2016
HEDG 46 4.35% 0.00% 2.17% 0.00% 2.17% 0.00%
Three-year
1992 to 1994, 1995 to 1997
GROW 414 0.24% 0.00% 0.24% 0.00% 0.24% 0.00%
MDCA 95 1.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1995 to 1997, 1998 to 2000
GRIN 350 0.57% 0.29% 0.29% 0.00% 0.29% 0.00%
GROW 527 0.38% 0.19% 0.38% 0.19% 0.38% 0.00%
1998 to 2000, 2001 to 2003
GRIN 444 0.23% 0.00% 0.23% 0.00% 0.23% 0.00%
MDCA 176 0.57% 0.00% 0.57% 0.00% 0.57% 0.00%
2001 to 2003, 2004 to 2006
GRIN 494 0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00%
MDCA 240 0.42% 0.00% 0.42% 0.00% 0.42% 0.00%
2004 to 2006, 2007 to 2009
TECH 93 1.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GRIN 467 0.21% 0.00% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GROW 939 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
MDCA 280 1.79% 0.00% 0.36% 0.00% 0.36% 0.00%
SMCA 442 0.68% 0.00% 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2007 to 2009, 2010 to 2012
GRIN 452 0.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GROW 878 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
HEDG 57 1.75% 0.00% 1.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INCO 102 0.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2010 to 2012, 2013 to 2016
GROW 1142 0.18% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00%
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Real Estate Investment & Service
Figure 1: Portfolio holdings of Real Estate Mutual Funds: The holding
percentage is computed as the market value of each industry divided by the total











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The OLS normal equations are






Multiplying through with e′i and exploiting the structure of Zi gives
(A2) ι′iri − Tiα̂i − ι′iXiβ̂i = 0
Eq. 3 follows immediately.







































and the right-hand side shows that these are just the estimators for θ1 and
θ2 from the individual regressions. It is clear that this outcome extend to
the case where we have more than two portfolios.
A.2 Simultaneous testing
If we test the hypothesis whether a fund manager has no skill with significance
level γ, the error rate (the probability of rejecting falsely) is P{Ri(γ) =
1|H0,i} = γ. If we test the performance of I fund managers without skill
simultaneously, each individually at level γ, the familywise error rate is
(A5)
P{R(γ) > 1|H0} = 1− P{R(γ) = 0|H0}
= 1− (1− γ)I
with R(γ) =
∑I
i=1Ri(γ). It is obvious that (A5) converges to one with
I and it becomes certain that at least one false rejection will occur. The
Bonferroni bound guards against this outcome and controls the familywise
53
error rate at least at γ by tightening the significance level for the individual
tests to γb = γI
−1, because
(A6)





= Iπ0γb 6 γ
where π0 is the share of fund managers for whom the null hypothesis is
correct. If indeed all fund managers are unskilled, π0 = 1, the Bonferroni
bound controls exactly at γ. If some fund managers have skill, π0 < 1 and
the Bonferroni bound controls at a significance actually stricter than γ. This
excess control comes at a cost to statistical power.32
A.3 Estimation of the share of correct nulls
We motivate the estimator for π0 first with the graphical approach suggested
by Schweder and Spjøtvoll (1982). For the actual estimation, we use a more
elegant estimator. In order to estimate π0, we use the observed cross-section
of p-values, most of them generated under the null of managers with no skill,
the rest generated under the alternative of managers with skill. The p-values
have the distribution function
(A7) F (p) = π0F0(p) + (1− π0)F1(p)
For observations from the null, p-values will follow a uniform distribution,
F0(p) = p.
33 For observations from the alternative, p-values will be small
and there will be a cut-off level λ < 1, so that F1(λ) = 1. We can therefore
write
(A9) F (p) =
{
π0p+ (1− π0)F1(p) for p ∈ [0, λ)
π0p+ (1− π0) for p ∈ [λ, 1]
Figure 3 shows F (p). To the left of λ, the slope is F ′(p) = π0 + (1−π0)F ′1(p)
and flattens out; to the right of λ, the slope is F ′(p) = π0 and constant.
Therefore, λ is the point at which the slope of F (p) becomes linear. With
32 Finner and Gontscharuk (2009) have suggested to use γb = γ(π0I)
−1 to control the
familywise error rate, which ensures control at γ.
33If t comes from the null distribution, it will not be in the acceptance region Aγ with
probability








(1− π0) + π0λ
Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution Function - F (p) of p-values of active
sector funds




To estimate this, we could determine λ̂ visually from Figure 3 and estimate
the distribution function as the fraction of p-values that are at most as large
as λ̂.34 Storey (2002, Section 9) has suggested a rigorous estimator for λ
based on a bootstrap procedure. This estimator gives π̂0 = 0.89.
35
Figure 4 presents the histogram of the p-values for the individual tests of
the null that a fund’s manager has no skills.
[Figure 4 here]
A.4 Fund shareclasses
Data directly reported from CRSP are at the shareclass level. CRSP provides
a separator in the fund name (“:” or “/”), and information after the separator
denotes subclasses. We split the ‘fund name’ by this separator, into the fund
family name and subclass (A, B, C). This approach can not distinguish all
34The density function of Eq. A9 becomes constant after λ and a histogram of the
p-values is an alternative approach to determine λ̂ visually.
35We use the R package from https://github.com/StoreyLab/qvalue and apply the cor-
rection term explained in Storey (2002, p.483).
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Figure 4: Distribution of Gross t(α) p-values of All Active Funds: The
p-values are one-sided, generated from the wild bootstrap procedure. The q-values
are generated from the p-values and plotted as the dotted line.
shareclasses thoroughly, thus along with name-splitting approach, we also
use the method proposed by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009), by using the
management company as the identifier for the shareclasses in the same fund
family. The combined method can successfully separate fund family name
and shareclasses.
A.5 Exclusion of index funds
To ensure our results are purely driven by fund manager active management,
we need to remove the passively operated index funds. CPSP provides the
passively managed fund identifier ‘index fund flag’ since June 2008. Strict
use of this method would omit some index funds whose inception dates are
prior to 2003. Thus, we manually check the passively managed funds prior
to 2003. Firstly we generate a list of common phrases that appear in fund
names identified by CRSP as index funds. We then compile a list of theses
common phrases in the labelled index funds, such as ‘Index’, ‘Idx’, ‘Ix’,
‘Indx’, ‘NASDAQ’, ‘Nasdaq’, ‘Dow’, ‘Mkt’, ‘DJ’, ‘S & P 500’, ‘BARRA’.
The use of this phrases has been proven accurate for an thorough coverage of
index funds by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009). We check the accuracy of
this manual approach by applying it to the funds after 2008, which have the
56
passive fund identifiers. And we find our approach can successfully identify
all passive sector funds.
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